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Reverse payment agreements have attracted the close attention of competition 
authorities as they are suspected to be the fundamental reason for 
encumbering competition in the pharmaceutical sector. For more than a 
decade the U.S. competition and judicial authorities have been scrutinising 
them, developing specific approaches suitable for their assessment. However, 
once the practice was deemed to be settled, the Third Circuit questioned this 
practice employing the new test. In the EU this type of agreement was not in 
focus until recently, therefore no relevant case law has developed whatsoever. 
Such uncertainty regarding the possible further developments in the 
assessment of reverse payment agreements is detrimental to the 
pharmaceutical industry, as it hinders companies’ ability to adopt their 
business strategies without the fear of triggering antitrust liability. This article 
will examine the current status of the reverse payment agreements in both 
jurisdictions, analyse the application of article 101 TFEU and Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act along with other relevant legislative provisions, the applied tests 
and approaches, and specific examples of the agreements decided by the U.S. 
courts. Such a discussion pursues the practical goal of expanding 
understanding of what constitutes permitted behaviour for pharmaceutical 
companies when concluding this type of agreement with a view to avoiding 
antitrust liability. 
 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 
Intellectual property is no longer the arcane domain of intellectual property lawyers.1 It is the most 
valuable corporate asset which a company may possess, and a powerful weapon against its competitors. 
Increased understanding of the importance of intellectual property rights has advanced their protection 
and exploitation to a new level. As businesses have developed a greater understanding of the value of 
their intangible assets, they have not only pursued more rigorous enforcement policies; they have also 
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invented more imaginative commercial strategies to gain and retain market share using their intellectual 
property.2 
 
As long as such practices facilitate robust competition, they are welcomed and encouraged. However, 
some strategies have triggered the concern of competition authorities. Where intellectual property rights 
are used to restrict competition significantly and impose barriers to market entry, intervention of 
competition law is likely. 
 
As one of the sectors most important to public health, the pharmaceutical industry has always warranted 
the close attention of competition authorities. Pharmaceutical companies rely heavily on intellectual 
property to protect their inventions and recoup their investment. It is also seen as the necessary incentive 
to advance innovation. Pharmaceutical companies therefore make great efforts to protect intellectual 
property rights, their main tool to ensure a large market share and to exclude competitors from the 
market for as long as their intellectual property allows them.  
 
Recently, the pharmaceutical industry has undergone significant changes: various “blockbuster” 
medicines, which account for a substantial part of the sales and profits of large pharmaceutical 
companies, have lost patent protection, with more to follow in the coming years.3 This shift has forced 
pharmaceutical companies to develop new and reinforce current business practices using their 
intellectual property rights to retain their market shares.  
 
However, not every practice is welcomed by the competition authorities. A number of new commercial 
practices used by pharmaceutical companies have been prohibited as exclusionary or exploitive abuses 
under the competition rules. The AstraZeneca case,4 for instance, raises the question of when a misuse 
of the patent process violates Article 102 TFEU.5 
 
Other practices have attracted the attention of competition authorities for being the suspected reason for 
the delay or blocking of generic drug competition.6 Such practices include patent settlement agreements 
concluded between originator companies and generic companies in the context of patent disputes and 
opposition procedures or litigation where no final adjudication has been handed down.7  
 
Certainly, not all patent settlement agreements are deemed illegal. Some are recognised as perfectly 
legal and even pro-competitive.8 Nevertheless, some of these agreements have triggered a flame debate 
as to their conformity within antitrust law. A main concern among competition authorities are so called 
reverse payment agreements, in which the originator company pays the generic company for staying 
off the market. Despite mutual concerns that this type of agreement may raise competition problems, 
there is no agreement about which of them should be considered illegal and violative of the competition 
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law and which may be allowed. In addition, there is no agreement as to which evaluative approach to 
take when considering such disputes. 
 
This article will review the patent settlement agreements under different regimes, including those of the 
EU and the U.S. This review starts by considering the general background of patent settlement 
agreements and their types. Then, turning to the U.S. and the EU legal frameworks regarding marketing 
authorisation underpinning the incentive for pharmaceutical companies to conclude this type of 
agreement, as well as the competition law provisions of article 101 TFEU and Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act, it further examines the respective positions of the FTC and the EU Commission regarding the 
patent settlement agreements.  
 
It will further detail the U.S. courts’ specific approaches to evaluating this type of agreement. On the 
basis of relevant U.S. case law, this article will extract general rules applied by the courts in their 
judgements. Finally, it will consider specific examples of both lawful and unlawful reverse payment 
agreements as decided by the courts and will explore whether the differences between the tests applied 
by the U.S. courts lead to different outcomes for these agreements. It will also examine the most recent 
decision of the US Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit and the impact it has on the previous case law 
regarding the reverse payment agreements. It will further discuss the possibility to apply the US tests 
for the evaluation of the reverse payment agreements to the EU realia considering some differences in 
the legal framework of these two regimes and will suggest the possible way the reverse payment 
agreements evaluation under the EU legislation and applying the EU competition law doctrines. 
 
Having discussed and analysed the legislative frameworks, competition authorities’ and courts’ 
respective positions toward the patent settlement agreements, and having examined examples of the 
patent settlement agreements, this article will finish with recommendations regarding the development 
of a coherent approach to the reverse payment agreements and possible submission of this type of 
disputes to the jurisdiction of the European Patent Court (EPC). This article also advices which 
provisions to avoid while negotiating patent settlement agreements in order not to trigger competition 
concerns. It is hoped that such analysis can offer a practical approach toward understanding what 
comprises permitted behaviour for pharmaceutical companies when concluding this type of agreement, 
to avoid antitrust liability. 
 
 
 
II. Patent Settlement Agreements and Types of Reverse Payment Agreements 
 
 
2.1 Patent Settlement Agreements: General Considerations 
 
Parties may opt to settle a dispute in or out of court to save time and money rather than pursuing the 
disagreement until the final court decision, which will likely prove unsatisfactory to at least one of the 
parties. Patent disputes settlements are no exception, as patent litigation is typically lengthy and 
extremely costly.9 The pharmaceutical industry in particular has recently favoured this type of 
agreement, where the patent is considered a primary corporate asset which the patent holder vigourously 
protects and which competitors target. 
 
When a patent litigation between brand-name10 and generic pharmaceutical companies occurs, it 
typically involves determining whether the relevant patents are valid and have been infringed. For the 
                                                          
9  Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry (n 8) (originator companies paid, on average, € 230,000 in legal fees per case in a single 
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and € 46,000) para 659. 
10  According to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act the term ‘brand name drug company’ means the party which 
holds the approved application (…) for a brand name drug which is a listed drug in an ANDA, or a party which owns 
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brand-name drug company to prevail, it must successfully defend the validity of its patents and show 
that the generic’s product would infringe those patents.11 For the generic company to succeed, it must 
prove that the patent is invalid or unenforceable and/or that its generic drug does not infringe the 
patent.12 Such disputes are extremely complex and demand enormous effort from both parties. 
Therefore, given the high costs of patent litigation and the potential uncertainty of the case outcome, 
brand-name and generic companies may wish to settle a dispute before a court decides on the merits. 
This trend is evidenced by the rapidly growing number of patent settlements during the last few years.13 
 
Such settlements do not necessarily raise competition law concerns. The parties may agree that the 
generic company may start marketing at some point before the patent expires, but not as soon as it 
expects through the litigation.14 This agreement will most likely reflect the parties’ beliefs on the 
likelihood of success of their legal positions in a dispute.15 Settlements which contain no other specific 
provisions normally do not raise competition concerns.  
 
However, particular types of patent settlement agreements have attracted scrutiny from competition 
authorities. The so-called ‘reverse payment’, ‘pay-for-delay’ or ‘exclusionary payments’ settlement, 
wherein some kind of consideration flows from the originator company to the generic company in 
exchange for the promise by the latter to refrain from entering the market, has sparked doubts about its 
conformity with competition law principles. The FTC launched a campaign against this type of 
agreements a decade ago, and the EU Commission and some other national competition authorities have 
made them a recent focus. 
 
The authorities’ main concern is that the pharmaceutical brand name company uses its monopoly profits 
to pay the generic company to stay out of the market, thus eliminating its direct competitor. This 
behaviour leads to decreased competition in the pharmaceutical sector and so harms consumers, who 
do not receive cheaper generic version of the drug as soon as they could have done with the generic 
company’s entry on the market. On the other hand, the proponents of the reverse payment agreements 
argue that these settlement agreements benefit the public in ending the costly litigation.16 As a result, 
pharmaceutical companies may invest the saved resources into further research for new drugs, and save 
time and effort on the part of the courts, patent offices and competition authorities to decide the matter, 
which also has positive public interests.17 
 
 
2.2. Specific Patent Settlement Agreements: Reverse Payment Agreements and Their Types 
 
Although some differences exist between the types of reverse payment agreements in the U.S. and the 
EU, one can highlight certain common provisions used by pharmaceutical companies when settling 
                                                          
a patent for which information is submitted for such drug (..) (Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 2003 (n 41) Sec. 1111). The EU equivalent of this term is ‘Originator company’. 
11  Federal Trade Commission Staff Study, ‘Pay-for-Delay: How Drug Company Pay-Offs Cost Consumers Billions’ 
(January 2010) <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/01/100112 payfordelayrpt.pdf> accessed 6 August 2012, 3 (FTC Pay-
for-Delay Study). 
12  ibid. 
13  3rd Monitoring Report (n 7) 6 (from 12 patent settlement agreements in 2000 to 120 in 2011). 
14  FTC Pay-for-Delay Study (n 11) 3. 
15  Federal Trade Commission Report, ‘Authorized Generic Drugs: Short-Term Effects and Long-Term Impact’ (August 
2011) < http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/08/2011-genericdrugreport.pdf > accessed 6 August 2012, 140 (FTC Authorized 
Generic Drugs Report). 
16  Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry (n 8) 255. 
17  3rd Monitoring Report (n 7) 2. 
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their disputes, based on FTC and EU Commission findings.18 The main provisions which raise 
competition concerns in this type of agreement are whether an agreement contains (i) 
limitation/restriction on market entry by the generic company and (ii) value transfer from the originator 
to the generic company.19 
 
The value transfer from the originator company to the generic company may take different forms, 
including: 
 
a plain monetary transfer from originator to generic company; 
 
non-monetary benefits from originator to generic company, which may include, 
inter alia: the originator company's granting a licence to the generic company to 
manufacture branded product;20 entering into the supply/distribution agreement with 
the generic company;21 entering into co-marketing and co-promotion agreements; a 
promise by the originator not to compete with the generic using its authorised 
generic (AGs). 22 
 
The generic company's restrictions on market entry also vary. The parties may agree that the generic 
company will enter the market before, upon or after the patent expires.  
 
Despite these provisions in reverse payment agreements have raised competition concerns it will be 
seen in section 4 of this article that not all of these agreements have been held as unlawful. 
 
 
 
III. Legal Framework 
 
3.1. Legal Framework Regarding Marketing Authorisation in the U.S. and the EU 
 
When discussing reverse payment agreements, one must understand the legal basis which creates 
incentives for generic companies to challenge a patent and for originators to protect it with a claim of 
patent infringement. Another important factor which requires understanding of the legal framework is 
that, whilst significant similarities exist between settlement agreements in the EU and the U.S., there 
are also some differences which result partly from the different regulatory frameworks.23 
                                                          
18  See Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry (n 8), 3rd Monitoring Report (n 7), FTC Pay-for-Delay Study (n 11), FTC 
Authorized Generic Drugs Report (n 15). 
19  Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry (n 8).270. 
20  3rd Monitoring Report (n 7) 3. ‘A licence granted by the originator company allowing market presence of the generic 
company is also categorised as limiting generic entry, because the generic company cannot enter the market with its 
own product or it cannot set the conditions for the commercialisation of its product freely.’ (internal references are 
omitted) ibid. 
21  ibid. ‘The same logic applies to patent settlement agreements in which the parties agree that the generic company will 
be a distributor of the originator product concerned or if the generic company will source its supplies of the active 
pharmaceutical ingredient (API) from the originator company.’ ibid. 
22  FTC Authorized Generic Drugs Report (n 15). ‘The AGs are pharmaceutical products that are approved as brand-name 
drugs but marketed as generic drugs. AGs do not bear the brand-name or trademark of the brand-name drug or 
manufacturer, but the brand-name and AG products are manufactured to the brand’s specifications.’ ibid. This form of 
compensation occurs when the brand-name company agrees not to launch its AG during the first-filer’s 180-day 
exclusivity period, in exchange for the first-filer’s agreement to delay its market entry. 
23  Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry (n 8) 290. ‘(…) [i]n the USA, the first generic company to file a paragraph-IV 
certification is explicitly rewarded by the legislator, whilst in the EU the first to market enjoys no statutory period 
during which he is protected against market entry of a second, third or subsequent generic company.’ ibid. This 
difference has created a specific type of value transfer – authorised generics as a bargaining asset to induce a generic 
company to refrain from entering the market. See FTC Authorized Generic Drugs Report (n 15) n 21. This value 
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3.1.1.  U.S. legislation 
 
To start marketing a drug in the U.S., a pharmaceutical company must first apply for approval to the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) under the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act.24 A brand-name 
company obtains FDA approval for the new drug through a New Drug Application (NDA) and must 
prove that its product is safe and effective.25 
 
 
(a) Hatch-Waxman Act 
 
The Hatch-Waxman Act,26 enacted in 1984, and amended in 2003,27 provides alternative ways for 
generic companies to obtain FDA approval for their products. The main purpose for introducing the 
Hatch-Waxman Amendments was to encourage generic companies to enter the market at an earlier 
stage, and thus facilitate competition with a brand-name drug28 which would ‘make available more low 
cost generic drugs’29 for consumers. The Act provides an accelerated process for submitting an 
‘Abbreviated New Drug Application’ (ANDA) to the FDA to gain approval for a drug which is shown 
to be a bioequivalent to a new drug previously approved by the FDA.30 Thus, in order to prove the safety 
and efficacy of the generic medicine a generic company now may to rely on the clinical data first 
submitted by the brand-name pharmaceutical company.31 
 
If the generic company wants to enter the market before the patent expiration for the brand-name drug, 
it may apply for ‘Paragraph IV’ ANDA certifying that the ‘patent is invalid or will not be infringed by 
the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the application is submitted.’32 The company 
must also include in the application a statement that it will give notice of its certification to each owner 
of the patent which is the subject of certification, including a detailed statement of the factual and legal 
basis of the applicant’s opinion that the patent is invalid or will not be infringed.33  
 
Paragraph IV certification constitutes a technical act of infringement.34 It empowers the patent holder 
brand-name drug company to bring an action for a patent infringement within 45 days of the received 
notice.35 The approval will be given immediately upon the expiration of 45 days if no such patent 
                                                          
transfer is typical for the U.S. market, but not the EU, as the lack of exclusivity period for the first filer offers no 
bargaining power to the originator company. 
24  21 U.S.C. § 301, 21 U.S.C. § 355(b). 
25  21 U.S.C. § 355(b),(c). 
26  Codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 and 35 U.S.C. §§ 156 and 271, 282. 
27  Amended as part of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernisation Act of 2003. 
28  FTC Pay-for-Delay Study (n 11) 3, See also Joseph J. Jacobi, ‘Reconsidering the Antitrust Implications of Settlement 
in ANDA Litigation’ [2010] SRR Journal http://www.srr.com/article/reconsidering-antitrust-implications-settlement-
andalitigation accessed 6 August 2012. 
29  H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, at 14 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647. (H.R. REP. NO. 98-857). 
30  21 U.S.C. § 355(j). See FTC Authorized Generic Drugs Report (n 15) 3. 
31  FTC Authorized Generic Drugs Report (n 15) 3. 
32  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV). 
33  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B). 
34  35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A). 
35  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
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infringement action is brought within that period.36 However, if the brand-name company does file a 
patent infringement suit within the stated period, the approval shall be made effective upon the 
expiration of the30-month period beginning on the date of the receipt of the notice or upon a favourable 
decision of the court – whichever comes earlier.37 
 
Once the earliest event occurs, the FDA may authorise the marketing of the generic drug, and the first 
applicant of Paragraph IV ANDA becomes entitled to 180-day exclusivity period.38 This exclusivity 
period means that subsequent ANDA applications will become effective only upon the expiration of 
this period,39 which effectively protects the first to file generic company from generic competition 
during this period. It thereby provides an incentive to challenge patents of brand-name pharmaceutical 
companies seeking to enter the market prior to patent expiration.40 
 
 
(b) Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 
 
Following FTC recommendations,41 Congress passed the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, 
and Modernization Act of 200342 to address irregularities created by the Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments.43 The Act includes only one 30-month stay per ANDA,44 forfeiture of the 180-day 
exclusivity period under certain circumstances45 and, most important, the stipulation that agreements 
between ANDA applicants or between ANDA applicants and NDA holders must be filed with the 
Department of Justice and the FTC within 10 days of execution.46 
 
 
3.1.2 EU Legislation 
 
In the EU, as in the U.S., a pharmaceutical company must obtain marketing authorisation (MA) for a 
drug to be placed on the market.47 Two types of authorisation exist: national authorisation, which is 
issued by the competent authorities of the EU Member States and is effective on its territory,48 and 
community authorisation, which is issued by the European Commission on the basis of the centralised 
procedure and covers the territory of the EU.49 Regulation (EC) No 726/200450 governs the centralised 
                                                          
36  ibid. 
37  ibid. 
38  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I)–(II). 
39  ibid. 
40  FTC Authorized Generic Drugs Report (n 15) 3. 
41  Federal Trade Commission, ‘Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study’ (July 2002) < 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf> accessed 6 August 2012. 
42  Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.) (Medicare Act). 
43  Anne-Marie C. Yvon, ‘Settlements Between Brand and Generic Pharmaceutical Companies: A Reasonable Antitrust 
Analysis of Reverse Payments’ (2006) 75 Fordham Law Review 1883, 1896. 
44  Medicare Act (n 42) Sec.1101. 
45  ibid. Sec.1102. 
46  ibid. Sec. 1112,1113. See also Yvon (n 43) 1897. 
47  Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry (n 8) 115. 
48  ibid. 
49  ibid. 
50  Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 laying down 
Community procedures for the authorisation and supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use and 
establishing a European Medicines Agency, OJ L 136, 30.4.2004, p 1 (Regulation (EC) No 726/2004); see also 
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procedure, which offers a single application, a single evaluation, a single authorisation and the right to 
market medicinal product in all EU Member States.51 
 
The generic company may receive marketing authorisation without providing its own pre-clinical tests 
and clinical trials if it can show that its medicine is a generic version of a previously approved drug.52 
The authority relies on the tests and trials for the already approved drug, submitted by originator 
company, but only after the expiration of the data exclusivity period which protects the data relating to 
the approved drug.53 
 
Before 2004, the EU did not regulate product development by the generic company whilst the 
originator’s patent was still alive; each country decided this issue at the national level.54 The legal 
uncertainty about whether the research for the marketing authorisation before the patent’s expiration 
amounted to patent infringement forced generic companies to wait for patent expiration to carry out 
their product development and related testing in countries where the basic patent had already expired 
or where such protection did not exist.55 
 
The Directive 2004/27/EC was introduced to eliminate this uncertainly.56 The so-called ‘Bolar’ 
provision was designed to give generic companies an exemption for pre-marketing testing, to bring EU 
legislation closer to the U.S.57 This provision creates a safe harbour for certain tests and studies whilst 
the reference product is still patent-protected in the EU so as to enable the generic producer to apply for 
marketing authorisation once the period of data exclusivity granted to the holder of the original MA has 
elapsed.58 After the implementation of this Directive, therefore, a generic company can obtain market 
authorisation for a bioequivalent drug before the patent has expired, which allows the company to start 
marketing its drug immediately after the patent expires.59 
 
 
3.1.3 Differences between the U.S. and EU Legal Frameworks 
 
Despite general similarities between the U.S. and EU legal frameworks regarding drug-marketing 
authorisations, certain differences have led to the evolution of specific provisions of the reverse 
payment agreements pertaining to the particularities of the legal provisions in the respective 
jurisdictions.  
                                                          
Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the Community Code 
relating to medicinal products for human use, OJ L 311, 28.11.2001, p 
67.  (Directive 2001/83/EC). 
51  Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry (n 8) 118. 
52  Directive 2001/83/EC (n 50) Art. 10. 
53  ibid. See also Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry (n 8) 119. 
54  Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry (n 8) 122. See also Kristof Roox, ‘The Bolar provision: a safe harbour in Europe for 
biosimilars’, (2006) 172 EURAlex                                                                                                                                                                                           
< http://www.crowell.com/documents/DOCASSOCFKTYPE_ARTICLES_614.pdf> accessed 6 August 2012. 
55  Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry (n 8) 123. See Roox (n 54). ‘In the US, for example, the US Court of Appeals initially 
ruled in the case of Roche v. Bolar that the experimental use of a drug for the purposes of obtaining regulatory approval 
for a generic version of a patented pharmaceutical product constituted a patent infringement. Following this case, US 
patent law was amended to include an exemption to permit such activities’. See also Aria Joze Zomorodian, ‘Settlement 
Agreements in Patent Litigation; American lessons for a European context’ (Master thesis, Lund University 2012) 23. 
56  Directive 2004/27/EC the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 amending Directive 2001/83/EC 
on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use OJ L 136, 30.4.2004, p 34. (Directive 
2004/27/EC). 
57  Roox (n 54) 19. 
58  Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry (n 8) 123-124. 
59  Zomorodian (n 55) 23. 
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Although, the implementation of Bolar provisions brought EU regulation closer to the U.S, the latter 
legislation has also expanded the possibilities of market entry by generic companies by introducing the 
so-called ‘Paragraph IV’ certification. This legislation enables generic companies to enter the market 
before a patent expires, an early entry encouraged by the 180-day exclusivity period granted to the first-
to-file generic company. These provisions have no equivalent in EU law. Such provisions in U.S. 
legislation have triggered new kinds of reverse payment agreements which are not specific to EU law.60 
This is the case of brand-name drug companies, instead of paying the generic companies for their 
promise not to enter the market, agree not to launch their authorised generics in competition with the 
approved generic drug during the 180-day exclusivity period.61 
 
 
3.2. U.S. and EU competition rules applicable to the reverse payment agreements 
 
 
3.2.1.  U.S. antitrust rules 
 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits ‘[e]very contract, combination (…) or conspiracy, in restraint 
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations’.62 
 
 
3.2.2. EU competition rules 
 
Historically, EU competition law treated patent settlement agreements like any other agreement.63 As 
defined by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the context of ‘no-challenge’ clauses: 
 
In its prohibition of certain ‘agreements’ between undertakings, Article [101 (1) TFEU]64 
makes no distinction between agreements whose purpose is to put an end to litigation and 
those concluded with other aims in mind.65  
 
The Commission scrutinises this kind of agreement under article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU), which prohibits agreements and concerted practices which may affect 
trade and prevent or restrict competition. 
 
Unlike U.S. legislation, Section 1 of the Sherman Act, article 101 TFEU contains paragraph 3, which 
provides for individual exemptions to the main prohibitions set in paragraph 1, subject to specified 
criteria. Thus, an agreement may be exempted provided that it:  
 
contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical 
or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and 
which does not: (a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not 
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; (b) afford such undertakings the 
possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in 
question.66 
                                                          
60  Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry (n 8) 291. 
61  FTC Authorized Generic Drugs Report (n 15) 141. 
62  15 U.S.C. §1. 
63  Sean-Paul Brankin, Patent settlements and competition law: where is the European Commission going?’ (2009) 5(1) 
Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 23, 23. 
64  Article 101 (1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
65  Case 65/86 Bayer AG v Maschinenmfabrik Hennecke GmbH & Heinz Sullhoftr [1988] ECR-5249, para 15. 
66  Article 101 (3) TFEU. 
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In addition, several block exemption regulations give guidance to undertakings on which agreements 
will be exempted.67 Of particular interest to this article is the Technology Transfer Block Exemption 
Regulation (TTBER), which addresses competition concerns arising, inter alia, due to patent licensing 
agreements.68 The TTBER recognises that technology transfer agreements usually improve economic 
efficiency, are pro-competitive and give rise to competition concerns only when the undertakings have 
a high level of market power and agree to incorporate particularly damaging restrictions within the 
agreement.69  
 
In its Guidelines to the TTBER,70 the European Commission acknowledges that the licence agreements 
‘in the context of settlement agreements and non-assertion agreements is not as such restrictive of 
competition since it allows the parties to exploit their technologies post agreement.’71 The Commission 
indicates, however, that ‘the individual terms and conditions of such agreements may be caught by 
Article [101](1) [TFEU].’72 The Commission defines that ‘[w]here the parties have a significant degree 
of market power and the agreement imposes restrictions that clearly go beyond what is required in order 
to unblock, the agreement is likely to be caught by Article [101].’73 The Commission does not explain 
what is meant by ‘beyond the unblocking’, but one may argue that, for instance, the restrictions relating 
to other intellectual property rights which are not in dispute may well be deemed as going beyond that 
needed to unblock.74 
 
 
 
IV. Competition Authorities’ Positions on Reverse Payment Agreements 
 
 
4.1 FTC Position 
 
For more than a decade, the FTC has been straggling with certain types of patent settlement agreements 
where the brand-name companies pay generics to delay entry.75 The FTC contends that, although 
branded pharmaceutical manufacturers and their generic competitors tend to view reverse payment 
settlements favourably, consumers may suffer as ‘they miss out on generic prices that can be as much 
as 90 per cent less than brand prices.’76 According to FTC staff analysis published in January 2010, 
exclusion payment settlements cost consumers $3.5 billion per year.77  
 
The FTC’s main concern regarding reverse payments is that the patent holder is using part of the profits 
from its patent monopoly to buy off the entry of its competitor.78 Thus, the FTC sees such agreements 
                                                          
67  Catherine Colston, Jonathan Galloway, Modern Intellectual Property Law (3rd edn, Routledge 2009) 25. 
68  Commission Regulation (EC) No 772/2004 of 27 April 2004 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to 
categories of technology transfer agreements, OJ L 123, 27.4.2004, 11  (TTBER), see also Colston (n 67) 26. 
69  TTBER (n 68) recitals para 5, see also Colston (n 67) 26. 
70  Commission Notice, ‘Guidelines on the application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty [now Art. 101 TFEU) to technology 
transfer agreements' OJ [2004] C 101/02 (Technology Transfer Guidelines). 
71  ibid, para 204. 
72  ibid. 
73  ibid, para 207. 
74  Anderman (n 2) 283. 
75  FTC Authorized Generic Drugs Report (n 15) i. 
76  FTC Pay-for-Delay Study (n 11) 1. 
77  FTC Pay-for-Delay Study (n 11) 2. 
78  Brankin (n 63) 24. 
11 
 
as a violation of antitrust law, namely Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The FTC argues that such 
settlements may raise serious competition concerns when they involve compensation from the brand-
name company to the generic company to delay generic entry beyond the time of a simple compromise 
date.79 According to the FTC position, such settlements ‘thwart the goal of the Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments to encourage generic companies to challenge questionable patents and promptly ‘make 
available more low cost generic drugs’, while simultaneously protecting legitimate patent claims 
covering innovator drugs.’80 The FTC has challenged a number of these agreements, and is lobbying 
for them to be recognised as illegal at the legislative level.81 
 
 
 
4.2. European Commission Position 
 
Unlike the U.S., in Europe patent settlement agreements have neither raised significant interest by the 
European Commission previously82 nor have they been the subject of consideration before the CJEU. 
 
However, inspired by its U.S. counterpart and following the AstraZeneca case,83 the EU Commission 
has launched intensive monitoring of competition in the pharmaceutical sector.84 Its Executive 
Summary of the Pharmaceutical Inquiry Report emphasises ‘[t]he importance of a well-functioning 
pharmaceutical sector and the presence of certain indications that competition in the pharmaceutical 
market in the European Union might not be working well.’85 The inquiry aimed ‘[t]o examine the 
reasons for observed delays in the entry of generic medicines to the market and the apparent decline in 
innovation as measured by the number of new medicines coming to the market.’86 The inquiry sought 
inter alia to examine practices which ‘[c]ompanies may use to block or delay generic competition.’87 
 
The inquiry identifies patent settlement agreements among such practices which delay or block generic 
entry.88 The European Commission sees agreements which limit market entry of the generic and include 
a value transfer from the originator company to a generic company as potentially anticompetitive.89 The 
Commission also deems potentially problematic those agreements which include restrictions beyond 
the exclusionary zone of the patent, meaning that they reach beyond its geographic scope, its period of 
protection or its exclusionary scope.90 The Commission explains that the reason for this concern 
                                                          
79  FTC Authorized Generic Drugs Report (n 15) 140. The simple compromise date according to the FTC is when ‘the 
brand and generic settle the litigation simply by agreeing on a time for generic entry that is prior to patent expiration 
but later than immediate entry without any compensation.’ ibid. 
80  FTC Authorized Generic Drugs Report (n 15) 141 citing H.R. REP. NO. 98-857 (n 29). 
81  Federal Trade Commission, ‘Statement by FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz Regarding Senate Judiciary Committee 
Mark-up of Legislation Stopping Illegal Pay-for-Delay Drug Settlements’ (07/21/2011) < 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/07/pdfmarkup-.shtm> accessed 6 December 2012. 
82  Brankin (n 63) 23. 
83  AstraZeneca (n 4), the EU General Court agreed with the Commission's findings of the AstraZeneca’s abuse of a 
dominant market position in the pharmaceutical sector via misusing the regulatory framework to delay the market 
entry of competing generic products. 
84   Commission Decision of 15 January 2008 initiating an enquiry into the pharmaceutical sector pursuant to Article 17 
of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 (Case No COMP/D2/39.514). 
85  Executive Summary (n 3). 
86  ibid. 
87  ibid. ‘The scope of the inquiry included companies with 80% of the relevant turnover in the EU, 43 originator and 27 
generic companies, limiting products to medicines for human use within the 27 member states and the time limitation 
was from 2000 to 2007.’ ibid. 
88  ibid. 
89  ibid. 
90  3rd Monitoring Report (n 7). 
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regarding this type of agreements is that such agreements do not relate directly to the IP rights granted 
by the patents in question.91 The Commission also indicates as problematic those agreements which 
include settlement agreements on a patent which the patent holder knows that it does not meet the 
patentability criteria. 92 For instance, a patent may be granted following the provision of incorrect, 
misleading or incomplete information. 93 Therefore, the European Commission decided to monitor 
further the settlements ‘with a potential to adversely affect European consumers.’94 Currently, three 
Reports in the Monitoring of Patent Settlements were concluded.95  
 
Following its inquiry into the pharmaceutical sector and monitoring exercises, the Commission has 
opened formal antitrust investigations against originator and generic companies suspected of engaging 
in anticompetitive practices and it has examined their patent settlement agreements. The two major 
cases concern the brand-name companies Lundbeck and Les Laboratoires Servier.  
 
According to the Commission press release, the Danish company Lundbeck and its four generic 
competitors were informed of the Commission’s objections regarding their settlement agreements 
concerning Citalopram, an antidepressant.96 The Commission has expressed its preliminary view that 
these agreements aimed to prevent the market entry of cheaper generic medicines in violation of Article 
101 TFEU.97  
 
According to the Commission, these agreements were concluded when the generic entry became 
possible after certain Lundbeck's patents had expired. 98 The agreements contain substantial value 
transfers from Lundbeck to the generic companies, and resulted in the subsequent refrain by the latter 
from entering the market. 99 The value transfers occurred via direct payments from Lundbeck to the 
generic companies and via the purchase of generic Citalopram stock for destruction or guaranteed 
profits in a distribution agreement. 100 The Commission considers that these agreements may have 
caused substantial consumer harm, as they may have delayed the entry of generic medicine for up to 
two years. 101 The price of Citalopram remained high as a result. 102 
 
                                                          
91  ibid. 
92  ibid. 
93  ibid. 
94  Executive Summary (n 3) 20. 
95  European Commission, ‘1st Report on the Monitoring of Patent Settlements (period: mid 2008-end 2009)’ (5 July 
2010) <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/-pharmaceuticals/inquiry/patent_settlements_report1.pdf> accessed 6 
August 2012; European Commission, ‘2nd Report on the Monitoring of Patent Settlements (period: January-December 
2010)’ (6 July 2011) <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/- 
pharmaceuticals/inquiry/patent_settlements_report2.pdf> accessed 6 August 2012; 3rd Monitoring Report (n 7). 
96  European Commission Press Release, ‘Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of Objections to Lundbeck and others 
for preventing market entry of generic antidepressant medicine’ IP/12/834 (25 July 2012) 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/12/834&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&gui
Language=en>accessed 6 August 2012. 
97  ibid. 
98  ibid. 
99  ibid. 
100  ibid. 
101  ibid. 
102  ibid. 
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Another major investigation was launched against the French pharmaceutical company Les 
Laboratoires Servier.103 In its press release on 30 July 2012,104 the Commission stated that Servier and 
its several generic competitors were informed of the Commission’s objections against their patent 
settlement agreements and Servier's acquisition of key competing technologies, which may have 
delayed the generic entry of the cardiovascular medicine Perindopril. The Commission alleges that 
Servier unduly protected its market exclusivity by inducing its generic challengers to conclude patent 
settlements, which the Commission considers a violation of EU competition rules prohibiting restrictive 
business practices and the abuse of a dominant market position (respectively articles 101 and 102 
TFEU).105 Additional pending investigations concern Cephalon and Teva106 and Johnson & Johnson 
and Novartis107 for potential violations of the EU competition rules. 
 
 
 
V. U.S. Courts’ Developments: Approaches, General Rules and Specific Examples of Reverse 
Payments Agreements 
 
 
5.1.  U.S. Courts’ Approaches to Reverse Payment Agreements 
 
Contrary to the firm position of the FTC regarding the anticompetitive nature of reverse payment 
agreements, U.S. courts are currently divided as to how to scrutinise such agreements. They were the 
subject of considerations in several appellate circuits, which have taken different approaches to their 
evaluations and have arrived at different conclusions. By examining the applied tests developed by the 
courts, the particular terms of the agreements and the outcome of the cases, we will determine which 
reverse payment agreements were deemed lawful and which were deemed anticompetitive. 
 
 
5.1.1. ‘Per Se Illegality’ Approach 
 
This approach was taken by the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Sixth Circuit in the case of ‘first 
impression’. The case involved payment from a brandname company to a generic company in exchange 
for the promise by the latter to refrain from entering the market even after the FDA’s approval.108 The 
Court explained that most restraints are evaluated using a ‘rule of reason’, other restrains, however, ‘are 
deemed unlawful per se’109 because they ‘have such predictable and pernicious anticompetitive effect, 
                                                          
103  European Commission, Memo ‘Antitrust: Commission opens formal proceedings against Les Laboratoires Servier and 
a number of generic pharmaceutical companies’ (July 2009) MEMO/09/322 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO-/09/322&format=HTML&aged=0&language> 
accessed 6 July 2012. 
104  European Commission Press Release, ‘Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of Objections on perindopril to Servier 
and others’ IP/12/835 (30 July 2012) 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/12/835&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&gui
Language=en> accessed 6 July 2012. 
105  ibid. 
106  European Commission Press Release, ‘Antitrust: Commission opens investigation against pharmaceutical companies 
Cephalon and Teva’ IP/11/511 (28 April 2011) 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/511&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&gui
Language=en> accessed 6 July 2012. 
107  European Commission Press Release, ‘Antitrust: Commission opens proceedings against Johnson & Johnson and 
Novartis’ IP/11/1228 (21 October 2011) 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/1228&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&gu
iLanguage=en> accessed 6 July 2012. 
108  In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003), cert denied, 125 S.Ct. 307 (2004) (Cardizem 
6th Cir. 2003). 
109  ibid 906. 
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and such limited potential for pro-competitive benefit.’110 It referred to the Supreme Court, which ‘has 
identified certain types of restraints as subject to the per se rule. The classic examples are naked, 
horizontal restraints pertaining to prices or territories.’111 
 
The Court reiterated that ‘(...) the virtue/vice of the per se rule is that it allows courts to presume that 
certain behaviours as a class are anticompetitive without expending judicial resources to evaluate the 
actual anticompetitive effects or pro-competitive justifications in a particular case.’112 Thus, applying 
this test, the Court rejected any arguments regarding the pro-competitive nature of the agreement and 
held that the agreement was ‘at its core, a horizontal agreement to eliminate competition (…)’ and ‘a 
classic example of a per se illegal restraint of trade.’113 
 
 
5.1.2. ‘Rule of Reason’ Approach 
 
The U.S. Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit used a different approach.114 In deciding on the 
lawfulness of the agreement, the Court applied the ‘rule of reason’ analysis, which involves a three-step 
process.115 ‘First, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that the defendant’s conduct ‘had an 
actual adverse effect on competition as a whole in the relevant market’. If the plaintiff satisfies this 
burden, the burden then shifts to the defendant to offer evidence that its conduct had pro-competitive 
effects. If the defendant is able to offer such proof, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff who must 
prove that any legitimate competitive effects could have been achieved through a less restrictive 
alternative.’116 
 
The Federal Circuit, agreeing with the Second Circuit regarding the application of this test, explained 
that the starting point is to define the relevant market and to determine whether the defendants possess 
market power therein.117  
 
To analyse further whether there was ‘actual adverse effect on competition’, the first step of the ‘rule 
of reason’ test, the Second Circuit raised the question of whether reverse payments agreements ‘fall 
within the scope of the patent holder’s property rights, or whether such settlements are properly 
characterized as illegal marketing-sharing agreements.’118 Approaching this question, the Court referred 
to the Court’s previous decision in another case,119 stating that the right to enter into such an agreement 
falls within ‘the terms of the exclusionary grant conferred by the branded manufacture’s patent’.120 It 
added that, unless the patent was obtained by fraud patent or an enforcement suit is objectively baseless, 
                                                          
110  ibid 906 citing Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5, 78 S.Ct. 514, 2 L.Ed.2d 545 (1958). 
111  ibid 907. 
112  ibid 909. 
113  ibid. 
114  Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG (In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig.) 604 F.3d 98 
(2d Cir. 2010), cert.denied, 131 S.Ct. 1606 (2011) (Cipro 2d Cir. 2010). 
115  ibid,104. 
116  Cipro 2d Cir. 2010 (n 114) 104 citing Capital Imaging Assocs., P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., Inc., 996 F.2d 
537 (2d Cir. 1993). 
117  Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG (In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig.), 544 F.3d 
1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 2828 (2009) (Cipro Fed. Cir. 2008) 1332 citing Geneva Pharms. Tech. 
Corp. v. Barr Labs.,Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 495-96 (2d Cir. 2004), and United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 
238 (2d Cir. 2003). 
118  Cipro 2d Cir. 2010 (n 114) 104. 
119  Joblove v. Barr Labs., Inc. (In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.), 429 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2005), amended by, 466 
F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006) (Tamoxifen 2d Cir. 2006). 
120  Cipro 2d Cir. 2010 (n 114) 105. 
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‘there is no injury to the market cognizable under existing antitrust law, as long as competition is 
restrained only within the scope of the patent.’121 
 
The Federal Circuit, applying the same ‘rule of reason’ test, stated that there was no evidence that the 
settlement agreements created a bottleneck on challenges to the patent or otherwise restrained 
competition outside the ‘exclusionary zone’ of the patent.122 Therefore, ‘the plaintiffs had failed to 
demonstrate that the Agreements had an anti-competitive effect on the market for [the drug] beyond 
that permitted by the patent.’123 Since the plaintiffs had not provided the facts needed under the first 
step of this analysis, the Court found it unnecessary to consider the second or third step. 124 
 
 
5.1.3. ‘Scope of the Patent’ Test 
 
In deciding on the lawfulness of reverse payment agreements, the Eleventh Circuit preferred a more 
traditional analysis. It focused on the permissible exclusionary scope under the patent as compared to 
the exclusions and anticompetitive effects arising out of the agreement.125 The court explained that 
‘neither the rule of reason nor the per se analysis is appropriate in this context,’126 as these tests aim to 
determine whether the agreement had an anticompetitive effect on the market.127 However, the Court 
indicated that ‘by its nature patents create an environment of exclusion, and consequently, cripple 
competition. The anticompetitive effect is already present.’ 128  
 
The Court added, that ‘the proper analysis of antitrust liability requires an examination of: (1) the scope 
of the exclusionary potential of the patent; (2) the extent to which the agreements exceed that scope; 
and (3) the resulting anticompetitive effects.’129 When discussing the first step of the test, the court held 
that an agreement cannot exclude more competition than the patent has the potential to exclude.130 
Otherwise, the patent holder ‘has used the settlement to buy exclusionary rights that are not contained 
in the patent grant, and those additional rights are vulnerable to antitrust attack.’131 Thus, if the 
anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent, the parties are 
immune from antitrust liability.132 The Court stated that, under the patent, the originator company had 
the right to exclude the generic companies from the market133 and to grant licenses.134 Such rights 
existed until the patent expired, or until the generic manufacturers proved either that the patent was 
invalid or that their products did not infringe upon the originator’s patent.135 
 
                                                          
121  ibid 106 citing Tamoxifen 2d Cir. 2006. 
122  Cipro Fed. Cir. 2008 (n 117) 1332 citing In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 363 F. Supp. 2d 514 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) 540. 
123  ibid. 
124  ibid. 
125  Jacobi (n 28). 
126  Schering Plough Corp. v.FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1065 (11th Cir. 2005) (Schering Plough 11th Cir. 2005). 
127  ibid. 
128  ibid. 
129  ibid 1066. 
130   FTC v. Watson Pharms, Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1308 (11th Cir. 2012) (Watson Pharms, 11th Cir. 2012). 
131  ibid. 
132  ibid 1309 citing Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 
U.S. 939 (2004) 1311 (Valley Drug 11th Cir. 2003). 
133  Schering Plough 11th Cir. 2005 (n 126) 1066. 
134  ibid 1067. 
135  ibid 1066–67. 
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Under the second step of the test, the court analysed whether the settlement extended the originator’s 
exclusionary rights beyond that scope. The court held that, as the settlements permitted generic 
companies to market their generic drugs several years before the patent’s expiration, the competition 
was excluded for a shorter period than the patent allowed.136 As a result, the Court determined that ‘the 
reverse payment settlements did not impermissibly extend the originator’s patent monopoly.’137 
 
The third step of this analysis requires findings about whether the reverse payment agreements were 
indeed an ‘unfair method of competition.’138 It referred to the Supreme Court, which requires that the 
effects be actually anticompetitive.139 The Court defined that the patent claims covered the restraints at 
hand and defined this clause as an ‘ancillary restraint.’140 The Court decreed that, for a condition to be 
defined as an ancillary, ‘an agreement limiting competition must be secondary and collateral to an 
independent and legitimate transaction.’141  
 
The court stated that, under the agreement, the scope of the products subject to the specific entry date 
demonstrates an efficient narrowness and no other products were delayed by these ancillary restraints.142 
Moreover, the agreement covered the identical reach of the patent.143 Therefore, emphasising that the 
‘general policy of the law is to favour the settlement litigation’,144 the court concluded that the 
settlements ‘fell well within the protection of the patent and were therefore not illegal’.145 
 
 
5.1.4.  A Quick Look ‘Rule of Reason’ Analysis 
 
The Third Circuit used this approach in its most recent decision regarding reverse payment 
agreements.146 Notably, the agreements under review in this Court were already under consideration in 
the Eleventh Circuit.147 Applying the scope of the patent test, the latter declared these agreements lawful 
and not violative of antitrust law as they did not exceed the scope of the patent.  
 
The Third Circuit, considering the same agreements, disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit. The Court 
rejected the scope of the patent test and instead applied a quick look rule of reason analysis.148 This 
analysis is based on the economic realities of the agreement in question.149 Thus, the Court explained 
that the very existence of any payment from a brand-name company to a generic patent challenger who 
agrees to delay its market entry stands as prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint of trade.150 
                                                          
136  ibid 1068. 
137  Watson Pharms, 11th Cir. 2012 (n 130) 1310. 
138  Schering Plough 11th Cir. 2005 (n 126) 1072. 
139  ibid citing California Dental Association v. FTC, 128 F.3d 720, (9th Cir. 1997) 775 n.12. 
140  ibid 1072. 
141  ibid 1073 citing Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 224. 
142  ibid. 
143  ibid. 
144  ibid 1073 citing Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368, (6th Cir. 1976) 1372. 
145  ibid 1076. 
146  In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 2012 WL 2877662 (3d Cir. July 16, 2012) (In re K-Dur 3d Cir. 2012). 
147  Schering Plough 11th Cir. 2005 (n 126). 
148  ibid 32. 
149  ibid. 
150  ibid 33. 
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One may rebut this presumption by showing that the payment (1) was for a purpose other than delayed 
entry or (2) offers some pro-competitive benefit.151 
 
 
5.1.5.  Brief Conclusions on the U.S. Courts’ Tests 
 
Despite the courts’ different approaches, namely the per se test, rule of reason and scope of the patent 
test, they ultimately arrived at the same conclusion: as long as the scope of the patent covers the 
agreement and this patent was not procured by fraud or the litigation is not baseless, the agreement is 
lawful and does not violate antitrust law.  
One may well argue that this practice was almost settled until recently. However, the Third Circuit 
undermined the practice with its decision152 which refused to consider the reverse payment agreements 
from the patent/antirust point of view and instead concentrated on the existence of the reverse payment. 
As a result, there currently exist two Appellate Court decisions – by the Third and the Eleventh Circuits 
– which, through different approaches, arrived at opposite conclusions regarding the same 
agreements.153 
 
Notably, the decision of the Eleventh Circuit is often cited for triggering the increased number of reverse 
payment agreements.154 The Third Circuit’s decision regarding the same agreements may well lead to 
a prohibition of, or limitations imposed on, reverse payment agreements. In any case the Third Circuit’s 
decision may mark the reason for the Supreme Court to decide this issue and finally define the coherent 
evaluative approach. 
 
 
 
5.2.  General Rules Inferred From the U.S. Case Law 
 
As was noted above, disputes regarding reverse payment agreements are comparatively a new type of 
disputes in the U.S., and some circuits still need to consider them at a ‘first impression’. Analysing the 
U.S. case law reveals a divergence in the evaluation techniques applied to these agreements, and legal 
society thus advocates for the harmonising the case law by implementing a coherent approach for 
treating and deciding on such disputes,155 as some fear that these divergences may lead to opposite 
decisions regarding the same kind of agreements.156 There are indications, however, that despite the 
above factors courts in general consistently segregate the specific types of reverse payment agreements. 
This practice derives from common rules from the previous antitrust and patent case law, and from new 
rules emerging from the recent case law on pay-for-delay agreements.157 Analysing the courts’ decisions 
infers the following general rules, which the courts explicitly or implicitly accept and which relate to 
the disputes regarding reverse payment agreements. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
151  ibid. 
152  In re K-Dur 3d Cir. 2012 (n 146). 
153  In re K-Dur 3d Cir. 2012 (n 146) and Schering Plough 11th Cir. 2005 (n 146). 
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5.2.1.  Presumption of Patent Validity 
 
Some argue that reverse payment settlements fall within the exclusionary scope of the patents in 
question, provided those patents are valid.158 Thus, in considering this type of disputes, the courts 
generally refer to the presumption of patent validity established in the law.159 Based on this presumption, 
courts consider the issue of the reverse payment agreements’ compatibility with the competition rules 
without prior revision of patent validity. 
However, some authors question this legal presumption.160 What if the patent is weak or obviously 
invalid? The proper challenge would result in the revocation or invalidity of the patent.161 Concluding 
the settlement in such a case could prevent such outcomes and thus unduly extend the period of 
protection enjoyed by the patent holder.162 As the Second Circuit acknowledged: 
 
If courts do not discount the exclusionary power of the patent by the probability of the 
patent's being held invalid, then the patents most likely to be the subject of exclusion 
payments would be precisely those patents that have the most questionable validity.163 
 
Some argue that, if any of the presumptions regarding the patent validity fall, the agreement 
undoubtedly marks an unlawful restraint of trade.164 Therefore, the question is whether the courts should 
consider patent validity as part of their analyses of these disputes.165 Answering this question, the 
Federal Circuit agreeing with the Second and Eleventh Circuits stated that, if there is no evidence that 
a patent was procured by fraud or that litigation is sham, there is no need to consider patent validity in 
this type of dispute.166  
 
Although this presumption of patent validity is generally considered irrefutable, the Third Circuit 
questioned it in its recent decision. The Court stated that, rather than adopting such a presumption, it 
should be taken into account that ‘a patent, in the last analysis, simply represents a legal conclusion 
reached by the Patent Office.’167 The Court concluded that ‘the public interest supports judicial testing 
and elimination of weak patents.’168 
 
The Court determined that, with respect to reverse payments agreements, such logic is persuasive: as 
they ‘permit the sharing of monopoly rents between would-be competitors without any assurance that 
the underlying patent is valid’.169 The Court explained that the goal of Hatch-Waxman Act is ‘to increase 
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the availability of low cost drugs’.170 Thus, in aiming to achieve this goal, it allows for the generic 
companies to challenge the brandname companies’ weak or narrow patents.171 
 
 
5.2.2. The Scope of the Patent 
 
Most of the courts have accepted that, as long as agreement falls within the scope of patent protection, 
it should be deemed lawful and consistent with the competition law.172 Analysing the reverse payment 
settlement agreement, the Second Circuit admitted that the agreement in question was doubtless 
anticompetitive,173 as it limited competition between a branded product and its generic version.174 
However, since it did not exceed the scope of the patent, it was not an unlawful anticompetitive 
agreement.175 In this respect, it is important to define the scope of the patent, which is seen to include 
the claims covered by the patent, term of protection and geographical area.176 The patent confers the 
right to exclude others from profiting from the patented invention.177 Patents do not, however, extend 
the patentee’s monopoly beyond its statutory right to exclude.178 The Second Circuit held that the 
settlement agreement did not exceed the scope of the patent where: (1) there was no restriction on 
marketing non-infringing products; (2) a generic version of the branded drug would necessarily infringe 
the branded firm’s patent; (3) the agreement did not bar other generic manufacturers from challenging 
the patent.179 
 
One example of exceeding the scope of the patent is when a generic company agrees to refrain from 
ever marketing a generic version of a patented drug.180 This means that settlement agreement will block 
generic competition after the patent expiration, and thus will exclude competition beyond the scope of 
exclusion granted by the patent.181 Another example is when a settlement agreement allows a generic 
company to retain its 180-day exclusivity period even though it has no intention to market its generic 
drug.182 This stipulation means that the exclusivity period, which begins after the date of first 
commercial marketing, would never be triggered.183 As a result, ‘the exclusivity period would have 
acted like a cork in a bottle, blocking other generic competition from pouring into the market.’184 Thus 
the agreement creates anticompetitive effects beyond the scope of the patent.185  
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However, the Third Circuit did not find the scope of the patent approach persuasive.186 Declining to 
follow it, the Court explained that it ‘improperly restricts the application of antitrust law and is contrary 
to the policies underlying the Hatch-Waxman Act and a long line of Supreme Court precedent on patent 
litigation and competition.’187 
 
 
5.2.3. Sham Litigation or Fraud in Obtaining a Patent 
 
The Federal Circuit stated that ‘an antitrust violation could be found in the extreme situation where 
there was evidence of fraud on the PTO or sham litigation.’188 Facing antitrust liability, a defendant 
may invoke the immunity under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which ‘allows private citizens to 
exercise their First Amendment rights to petition the government without fear of antitrust liability.’189 
However, ‘sham’ conduct falls within exceptions to the doctrine.190 As the Second Circuit stated, ‘the 
doctrine does not extend protection to the defendants ‘where the alleged conspiracy is a mere sham to 
cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships 
of a competitor’.191  
 
The situations in which the sham exception applies are defined as follows: first, where the lawsuit is 
objectively baseless and the defendant’s motive in bringing it was unlawful; second, where the conduct 
involves a series of lawsuits brought pursuant to a policy of starting legal proceedings without regard 
to the merits and for an unlawful purpose; third, if the allegedly unlawful conduct consists of making 
intentional misrepresentations to the court, litigation can be deemed a sham if a party’s knowing fraud 
upon, or its intentional misrepresentations to, the court deprives the litigation of its legitimacy.192 The 
third situation may be directed to not only a court but also the federal Patent and Trademark Office.193 
The patent obtained by fraud grants unlawful monopoly to the patent holder and thereby violates 
antitrust law. 
 
5.2.4.  The Agreement Must Settle the Dispute Finally 
 
The settlement must fully resolve litigation between the generic company and the originator company 
to enable the other generic manufacturers to enter the market. Interim settlements which aim to 
withdraw generic entry whilst the litigation is pending are viewed as unlawful.194 The Second Circuit 
stated that ‘rather than resolve the litigation, the settlements in those cases prolonged it by providing 
incentives to the defendant generic manufacturers not to pursue the litigation avidly.’195 The alleged 
purpose of this kind of agreement is to create a bottleneck: delaying the triggering of the 180-day 
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exclusivity period in turn delays the entry of both the first filer and any other potential generic 
company.196 
 
 
5.2.5.  Likelihood to Prevail in the Dispute 
 
Although courts have rejected the ‘likelihood to prevail in the dispute’ approach, it is one worth noting 
as the FTC firmly stands by this position. In one case involving the invalidation of the patent after the 
settlement agreement, the Eleventh Circuit held that in case the decision about the patent invalidity was 
held after the settlement agreement this decision should not be taken into account.197 All that matters is 
the patent’s ‘potential exclusionary power as it appeared at the time of settlement.’198  
 
The FTC has developed a ‘not likely to prevail’ test, arguing that ‘a patent has no exclusionary potential 
if its holder was not likely to win the underlying infringement suit.’199 It also argues that ‘if the patent 
has no exclusionary potential then any reverse payment settlement that excludes any competition from 
the market necessarily exceeds the potential exclusionary scope of the patent and must be seen as the 
patent holder’s illegal ‘buying off’ of a serious threat to competition.’200 The FTC advocates adopting 
a rule according to which ‘an exclusion payment is unlawful if, viewing the situation objectively as of 
the time of the settlement, it is more likely than not that the patent would not have blocked generic entry 
earlier than the agreed-upon entry date.’201 
 
The Eleventh Circuit rejected this proposed test firmly, holding that:  
 
Rational parties settle to cap the cost of litigation and to avoid the chance of losing. Those 
motives exist not only for the side that is likely to lose but also for the side that is likely, 
but only likely, to win. A party likely to win might not want to play the odds for the same 
reason that one likely to survive a game of Russian roulette might not want to take a turn. 
With four chambers of a seven-chamber revolver unloaded, a party pulling the trigger is 
likely (57% to 43%) to survive, but the undertaking is still one that can lead to 
undertaking.202 
 
 
 
5.3.  Examples of Reverse Payment Agreements as Decided by U.S. Courts 
 
The following are examples of terms and conditions of the reverse payment agreements which violate 
antitrust law, as decided by U.S. courts: 
 
 
5.3.1.  Examples of Unlawful Reverse Payment Agreements 
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(a)  Agreement Recognised As Per Se Illegal 
 
Agreement contained payments from the originator company to the generic company beginning on the 
date of FDA approval obtained by the generic company and ending on the date when the generic 
company started selling its generic version of the patented drug or when the court considering the patent 
infringement dispute recognised the infringement. In return, the generic company promised not to 
market its generic version of a patented drug even after the FDA approval. The agreement included 
generics which did not infringe the patent and promise by the generic company not to relinquish the 
180-day period of market exclusivity.203 
 
The Sixth Circuit held that such restrictions on market entry coupled with payments, non-infringing 
product and abuse of the 180-day market exclusivity precluding subsequent generic companies from 
entering the market are per se unlawful and violate antitrust law. Therefore, the court recognised this 
agreement ‘at its core, a horizontal agreement to eliminate competition in the market for a [patented 
drug] (...) a classic example of a per se illegal restraint of trade.’204 
 
 
(b)  Agreement Recognised As Illegal under the ‘Scope of the Patent’ Test 
 
Agreement contained recognition of the patent infringement by the generic company and promise to 
refrain from ever entering the market with its generic version of the drug in exchange for a license from 
brand-name company to manufacture a generic controlled version of the drug.205  
 
The Eleventh Circuit held that the promise to refrain from ever marketing a generic version of patented 
drug would block generic competition after the patent expired, and thus excluded competition beyond 
the scope of exclusion granted by the relevant patent.206 The agreement also allowed the generic 
company to retain its 180-day exclusivity period even though that company had no intention to market 
its generic drug.207 This agreement would have acted ‘like a cork in a bottle, blocking other generic 
competition’. Therefore, the Court determined that the settlement yielded anticompetitive effects 
beyond the scope of  he patent and was unlawful.208 
 
 
(c)  Common Features of Agreements Which Were Held Unlawful 
 
When evaluating the provisions of the above reverse payment agreements, the courts used different tests 
for their evaluations, yet the outcome was the same: these agreements were held unlawful. Comparing 
the provisions of these two agreements indicates that they have a common feature: their provisions, 
such as non-infringing product, refraining from ever marketing generic version and abuse of market 
exclusivity, go beyond the scope of the patent protection. Therefore, despite applying different tests, 
the courts reached the same conclusion that these agreements violate antitrust law. 
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5.3.2.  Examples of Lawful Reverse Payment Agreements 
 
The following reverse payment agreements were found lawful: 
 
(a)  Agreement Held Lawful Under the ‘Rule of Reason’ Approach 
 
According to the agreement, the originator company agreed to pay a lump sum immediately and make 
quarterly payments for the duration of the patent, except for the last six months before the patent’s 
expiration. The originator also agreed to provide the generic manufacturers a guaranteed licence to sell 
brand-name drug at a reduced rate for the six months before the patent’s expiration. In exchange, generic 
company recognised the patent validity and agreed not to market its generic version of a drug before 
the patent’s expiration.209 The Second Circuit found that the agreement is lawful as it falls within the 
scope of the patent.210 
 
(b)  Agreement Held As Lawful under the ‘Scope of the Patent’ Test 
 
Generic companies agreed not to market generic versions of a drug until five years before patent 
expiration unless another manufacturer launched its generic drug beforehand. They also agreed to 
promote branded drug to doctors and to serve as a backup manufacturer for branded drug. Originator 
company, in return, agreed to make yearly payments and additional annual payments for the backup 
manufacturing assistance.211 The court agreed with the district court that the agreement did not exceed 
the scope of the patent.212 
 
(c)  Common Features of the Agreements That Were Held Lawful 
 
Notably, these agreements contain restrictions on both generic market entry and value transfer from the 
originator company to the generic company. They also were evaluated under different approaches. 
Nevertheless, courts declared them lawful because they fell within the scope of the patent. As stated by 
the Federal Circuit: ‘wherein all anticompetitive effects of the settlement agreement are within the 
exclusionary power of the patent, the outcome is the same whether the court begins its analysis under 
antitrust law by applying a rule of reason approach to evaluate the anti-competitive effects, or under 
patent law by analysing the right to exclude afforded by the patent.’213 
 
 
5.3.3. Conflicting Decisions of the Eleventh and the Third Circuits 
 
Currently, there exist two conflicting decisions regarding the same agreement. The reverse payment 
agreements decided by both Circuits restricted the generic entry date to one earlier than patent 
expiration, the licence from the generic company to the originator company and payments from the 
originator company to the generic company which included legal fees and royalty for the licence.214  
 
On 8 March 2005 the Eleventh Circuit considering the dispute held this agreement lawful as it fell 
within the scope of patent protection.215 It took into account that the settlement excluded competition 
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for a shorter period before the patent expiration.216 It also held that payments from originator to generic 
company were a ‘fair price’ for the product under the licence granted by the generic company to 
originator, and therefore the aim of these payments was not to delay the market entry.217 Therefore, the 
Court rejected ‘a rule of law that would automatically invalidate any agreement where a patent-holding 
pharmaceutical manufacturer settles an infringements case by negotiating the generic’s entry date, and, 
in an ancillary transaction, pays for other products licences by the generic’.218 
 
On 16 July 2012, the Third Circuit considering the same agreements disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit 
and rejected the scope of the patent test. Instead, the court applied a quick look rule of reason analysis. 
It declared that any payment from patent holder to a generic company which promises to refrain from 
entering the market should be treated as prima facie evidence of unreasonable restraint of trade, unless 
it is proved that the payment did not seek to delay the generic market entry or offers a procompetitive 
effect.219  
 
As stated above, these two decisions sharply divided the circuits that prior to the latter decision despite 
the diverse approaches applied to the reverse payment agreements had ultimately arrived at a similar 
conclusion. Considering the importance of the issue, which concerns both public and private interests 
and which may distort the fragile balance between intellectual property protection and competition 
rules, this disagreement between circuits must be resolved. It is up to the Supreme Court or the 
legislative authorities to upend this discrepancy in the case law and to settle the coherent practice within 
the U.S. courts. 
 
 
 
VI.  EU Developments: Approaches and General Rules in Disputes Regarding Patent 
Settlement Agreements 
 
 
Although the EU lacks relevant case law regarding reverse payment agreements, it may prove helpful 
to explore the evolving pattern in the U.S. jurisprudence and modify it for the EU, and to infer 
approaches and general principles from the previous EU case law which might apply to reverse payment 
agreements. 
 
 
6.1.  Incorporating the U.S. Approaches and Tests for Reverse Payment Agreements into the 
European Legal Framework 
 
 
It is generally viewed that the EU competition authorities’ position would likely follow the U.S. courts’ 
approaches to assessing reverse payment agreements based on the exclusionary scope of a patent.220 In 
this respect, and considering the lack of relevant case law in the EU, it is interesting to analyse whether 
European courts may use the US courts’ current approaches and tests in disputes regarding reverse 
payment agreements. To understand whether the U.S. judicial approaches would suit the European 
competition environment, one must grasp the peculiarities of the European competition legal framework 
compared to that of the U.S. At the very basic level, the difference between these regimes is that the 
EU promotes a single market under the main principle of free movement of goods among its Member 
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States, which does not occur in U.S. competition law.  
 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act and its sister provision (albeit not identical) article 101 (1) TFEU aim to 
tackle practices which restrict competition in these two regimes.221 However, as discussed above, article 
101 goes further and offers in its paragraph 3 exceptions to the prohibitions set forth in paragraph 1. 
Therefore, the EU analysis of possible anticompetitive effect found within the scope of paragraph 1 will 
ultimately evaluate whether the agreement may be exempt under paragraph 3. These particularities 
cause certain difficulties in applying the U.S. tests and approaches to the EU realia. 
 
Moreover, as there are no provisions in the EU equivalent to the Hatch-Waxman Act which provides 
an exclusivity period to the first to file generic company, a reverse payment in the EU would only delay 
entry of the generic company which is a party to the agreement and would not delay generic entry in 
the market to any other generic company.222 Therefore, it may be argued, that the potential effects of a 
reverse payment are likely to be less restrictive of competition in the EU than in the U.S. I 
 
n further discussing possible applications of the U.S. approaches and tests analysed in section 4 of this 
article, the following will suggest relevant modifications subject to the EU law peculiarities in general, 
and to the specific nature of reverse payments agreements in particular. 
 
 
6.1.1.  Modified Per Se Test 
 
As shown above,223 the U.S. case law addresses certain types of trade practices which are considered 
plainly anticompetitive.224 These practices include agreements which fix purchase or selling prices, 
share markets or limit production.225 It was recognised that, where the agreement is plainly 
anticompetitive, the per se approach will be used. It was explained that the chances that these practices 
will not prove anti-competitive are so limited that, for reasons of judicial economy and certainty of law, 
they should be considered prohibited ex ante, without having to evaluate their actual competitive 
value.226 
 
The General Court227 acknowledged such an approach in the European Night Services & Co. v. 
Commission, which stated that: 
 
in assessing an agreement under Article [101] (1) of the Treaty, account should be 
taken of the actual conditions in which it functions (…) unless it is an agreement 
containing obvious restrictions of competition such as price-fixing, market-sharing 
or the control of outlets.228 
 
However, article 101 TFEU excludes the possibility of such ex ante analysis.229 Paragraph 3 states that 
‘any’ practice restricting competition and prohibited under paragraph 1 may be exempt from the 
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prohibition if it satisfies all conditions set forth in paragraph 3.230 In the Matra Hachette v. Commission 
the General Court stated that: 
 
in principle, no anti-competitive practice can exist which, whatever the extent of its 
effects on a given market, cannot be exempted, provided that all the conditions laid 
down in Article [101](3) of the Treaty are satisfied.231 
 
Thus, contrary to the U.S. legal doctrine, the EU legal framework requests an evaluation of the pro and 
anti-competitive effects of practices, not immediately under article 101 (1) TFEU, but further under 
article 101 (3) TFEU.232 
 
 
6.1.2. Modified ‘Rule of Reason’ Test 
 
The rule of reason doctrine has evolved in the U.S. jurisprudence and evaluates the pro- and anti-
competitive aspects of a given agreement.233 As the Supreme Court has stated, there are certain types 
of ‘agreements whose anti-competitive effect can only be evaluated by analysing the facts peculiar to 
the business, the history of the restraint and the reason why it was imposed’.234 Before 2001, there was 
no defined position of whether the rule of reason exists in the EU competition law.235 Some suggestions 
for implementing this test date back to the late-1960s.236 However, despite this doctrinal support, the 
CJEU was not convinced of the possibility to apply the rule of reason under article 101 (1) TFEU.237 
 
The Métropole Télévision decision resolved all doubts regarding the rule of reason test.238 In this case, 
the applicants argued that the Commission should have applied the then equivalent of article 101 (1) 
TFEU in light of a rule of reason, under which an anti-competitive practice falls outside the scope of its 
prohibition if it has more positive than negative effect on competition in a given market.239 However, 
the General Court held that such an interpretation of article 101 (1) TFEU was difficult to reconcile 
with the rules prescribed by that provision.240 Firmly rejecting this suggestion, the Court held that article 
[101 (3) TFEU] expressly allows for the possibility of exempting agreements which restrict competition 
if they fulfil the conditions prescribed by this paragraph.241 The Court emphasised that, only within this 
provision, one could apply the pro- and anti-competitive analysis of a restriction. It added that:  
 
Article [101 (3) TFEU] would lose much of its effectiveness if such an examination had 
to be carried out already under article [101 (1) TFEU].242  
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Thus, this decision implies that one cannot incorporate the rule of reason in its initial form from the 
U.S. case law into article 101 (1) TFEU. Rather, the balance of pro- and anti-competitive effects must 
be drawn on the basis of Article 101(1) in conjunction with article 101(3) TFEU.243 
 
 
6.1.3. Ancillary Restraints Doctrine in European Case Law 
 
Ancillary restraints are restraints which are needed to conclude a lawful contract, and their importance 
is subordinate to the latter. 244 The CJEU stipulated that the ancillary restraints to competition which are 
necessary to conduct a lawful practice do not fall within the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU.245 Thus, in 
the Remia v. Commission case, the Court recognised that such restraints were necessary for the non-
competition agreements included in sale of business contracts which ‘have the merit of ensuring that 
the transfer has the effect intended’,246 as long as their duration and scope are strictly limited to this 
purpose.247 
 
In Métropole Télévision, the General Court had discussed the ancillary restraints doctrine when 
considering the applicant’s claim that the exclusivity clause and the clause relating to the special-interest 
channels were ancillary to their joint venture. The applicant argued that, since the Commission had 
found that the joint venture did not infringe article 101(1) TFEU, the ancillary clauses should also have 
been cleared.248  
 
In its findings, the General Court stated that ‘the concept of an “ancillary restriction” covers any 
restriction which is directly related and necessary to the implementation of a main operation.’249 The 
Court held that ‘a restriction “directly related” to implementation of a main operation must be 
understood to be any restriction which is subordinate to the implementation of that operation and which 
has an evident link with it’.250 The Court defined two conditions for satisfying the necessity test: it must 
establish, first, whether the restriction is objectively necessary to implement the main operation and, 
second, whether the restriction is proportional to it.251 
 
For the finding of the objective necessity, the court determined that ‘[i]f, without the restriction, the 
main operation is difficult or even impossible to implement, the restriction may be regarded as 
objectively necessary for its implementation.’252 The Court referred to the Commission’s findings that 
a number of restrictions were objectively needed to implement certain operations if, failing such 
restrictions, the operation in question ‘could not be implemented or could only be implemented under 
more uncertain conditions, at substantially higher cost, over an appreciably longer period or with 
considerably less probability of success’.253 When the restriction was found objectively necessary to 
implement a main operation, ‘it is still necessary to verify whether its duration and its material and 
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geographic scope do not exceed what is necessary to implement that operation.’254 The Court explained 
that ‘[i]f the duration or the scope of the restriction exceed what is necessary in order to implement the 
operation, it must be assessed separately under article [101(3) TFEU].’255 
 
If the direct relation and the necessity conditions to achieve a main operation are established, one may 
examine the compatibility of that restriction with the competition rules together with that of the main 
operation.256 Therefore, if the main operation is found not to infringe article 101(1) TFEU, the same 
result must be found for the restrictions directly related to and necessary for that operation.257 
Alternately, if the main operation found to infringe article 101 (1) TFEU may be exempted under article 
101(3) TFEU as it satisfies its conditions, the exemption also extends to the ancillary restrictions.258 
 
6.1.4. Possible Way to Assess the Reverse Payment Agreements under EU Competition 
Law 
 
Applying the aforementioned approaches of the EU case law, one may suggest the following assessment 
of reverse payments agreements. Article 101(1) TFEU defines that an agreement falls within its 
prohibition when it has as its object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition. 
One may argue that the main purpose of the reverse payment agreements is to settle a patent dispute, 
thus ending the high-cost litigation which would last a considerable period. Settling the dispute 
therefore marks a main operation. The European Commission in its Guidelines has acknowledged in 
terms of the ‘non-challenge clauses’ that ‘the very purpose of the agreement is to settle existing disputes 
and/or to avoid future disputes’.259 Therefore, it is possible to conclude that such an agreement falls 
outside the scope of article 101 (1) TFEU. 
 
The provisions of the settlement agreement which limit generic competition (such as licence agreement) 
and contain the value transfer from the originator company to the generic company may be deemed 
ancillary restraints to the main operation. To conclude that limitation on generic competition and reverse 
payment are ancillary restraints, parties must prove that such restraints are directly related and necessary 
to implementing the main agreement, namely settling the dispute.  
 
The restraints relate directly to the main transaction if they are subordinate to the implementation of 
that transaction.260 As defined above, the settlement of the patent dispute is the main transaction. Thus, 
all provisions in the settlement which aim to resolve the dispute among the parties may be deemed 
subordinate, and thereby directly related, to implementing the transaction. Such settlement may include 
restrictions on the generic competition and certain value transfer from one party to another. 
 
The necessity test is satisfied if it establishes the following two conditions: (a) it is objectively necessary 
for the implementing the main operation; (b) it is proportional to the main operation.261 
 
Regarding the objective necessity, one may argue that, failing such restrictions, the parties would not 
agree to settle the dispute. For settlements to succeed, the generic company must acknowledge patent 
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validity and promise not to infringe it in the future, that is not to enter the market whilst it is pending. 
Likewise, signing the licencing agreement could prove objectively necessary, as continuing litigation 
would lead to uncertain outcome ‘at substantially higher cost, over an appreciably longer period or with 
considerably less probability of success.’262 Regarding proportionality, here one may incorporate the 
theory of the scope of the patent. If such limitations fall within the scope of the patent (i.e. concern the 
product covered by the patent, within its term of protection and geographical area), the restrictions may 
be considered proportionate. 
 
Thus, when such limitations on generic competition and reverse payment are found to be ancillary 
restraints, they must be further evaluated together with the main agreement. Therefore, as the settlement 
agreements fall outside Article 101 (1) TFEU so do the said ancillary restraints. 
 
 
 
6.2.  General Rules Inferred from the EU Case Law 
 
Deciding on the patent settlement agreements, specifically in the form of licence agreements, the CJEU 
adhered to the following principles. 
 
 
6.2.1.  The Scope of Intellectual Property Rights 
 
In its 3rd Report on the Monitoring of Patent Settlements, the Commission defined as potentially 
troublesome patent settlement agreements those with restrictions beyond the exclusionary zone of the 
patent, as they would not appear directly related to the intellectual property rights granted by the patents 
in question.263 According to the Commission, this position means that they would reach beyond its 
geographic scope, its period of protection or its exclusionary scope.264 
 
The CJEU jurisprudence may support such a position. In one of its decisions relating to the licence 
agreement, the CJEU stated that the clauses contained in the licencing agreements, in so far as they 
relate to parts of the invention not covered by the patent, may find no justification on grounds of 
protecting an industrial property right.265 Deciding further on the compatibility of the above clause, the 
Court concluded that it cannot accept that the obligation of the licencee only to sell the patented product 
in conjunction with a product outside the scope of the patent is indispensable to exploiting the patent.266 
 
The Court took the same position regarding the provisions which try to gain the protection granted by 
the patent in a country which lacks patent protection.267 The Court stated that it ‘limited freedom of 
competition by means of a clause which had nothing to do with the patent.’268 Moreover, in one of its 
decisions, the CJEU declared that the other party’s abandoning of its right to advertise its product in the 
settlement agreement ‘does not bear even the semblance of a connection with the question of the use of 
the [right concerned]’.269 
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Applying this case law to the reverse payment agreements, one may conclude that, in cases where the 
agreements contain provisions which include products not covered by the patent, extend to the territory 
beyond that defined in the patent or contain obligations of the party which have no connection to the 
patent, such agreement will go beyond the scope of the patent and thus will likely trigger competition 
concerns. 
 
 
6.2.2. ‘No-Challenge’ Clause 
 
In its Technology Transfer Guidelines, the European Commission acknowledges the ‘no-challenge’ 
clause in the settlement agreement. It states that: 
 
It is inherent in such agreements that the parties agree not to challenge ex post the 
intellectual property rights covered by the agreement. Indeed, the very purpose of the 
agreement is to settle existing disputes and/or to avoid future disputes.270 
 
Thus, the Guidelines generally consider non-challenge clauses to fall outside Article 101 (1) TFEU.271 
However, this position of the European Commission does not align with the previous CJEU case law.272 
The Court considers such clauses to fall outside ‘the specific subject matter of the patent, which cannot 
be interpreted as also affording protection against actions brought in order to challenge the patent’s 
validity’.273 The Court emphasised: ‘it is in the public interest to eliminate any obstacle to economic 
activity which may arise where a patent was granted in error’.274 Thus, such provisions were held as ‘an 
unlawful restriction on competition’.275 
 
 
6.2.3.  ‘Sham’ Conduct 
 
As stated above, licence agreements which settle a dispute are generally accepted.276 However, this 
tendency may be true only in case of a genuine dispute about a valid right.277 When ‘the dispute is sham, 
or if the right is itself invalid any “settlement” agreement involving restrictions of competition’278 will 
fall under Article 101 (1) TFEU.279  
 
In BAT Cigaretten-Fabriken GmbH v Commission, the CJEU considered the compatibility of a 
settlement agreement known as ‘delimitation agreement’ with the competition law.280 The agreement 
concerned the settlement of a trademark dispute related to one party’s application for trademark 
registration and the other party’s opposition, though the trademark proved to be dormant.  
 
The Court stated that the opposition by ‘the proprietor of an unused, dormant, trade mark which is liable 
to be removed from the register upon application by any interested party (...) as part of its efforts to 
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control the distribution of the [other party’s] products, constitute an abuse of the rights conferred upon 
it by its trade mark ownership.’281 Thus, the Court found that this agreement fell within the prohibition 
of Article 101 (1) TFEU.  
 
Therefore, in applying the CJEU’s conclusions to reverse payment agreements, one may contend that 
settling a patent dispute is lawful unless the originator’s enforcement of a patent is a sham due to patent 
invalidity. These actions will likely qualify as abuse of the rights conferred upon by the patent and will 
fall within the prohibition laid down by Article 101 (1) TFEU. 
 
 
 
VII.  Conclusions 
 
A classic tension between the intellectual property legal system and competition law recently has gained 
a sharp and tangible essence in moving from academic discussion to our everyday life. It has 
transformed into a fierce battle between competition authorities and pharmaceutical companies. The 
aim of the former is to protect competition to benefit consumers, using every possible tool 
(administrative, judicial, and political). The latter, meanwhile, claims the right to settle disputes with 
their competitors to protect their main corporate asset, by which they retain market share and secure 
their profits. 
 
Both the FTC and the European Commission have defined a separate group of patent settlement 
agreements which combine certain provisions, such as restrictions on generic market entry and value 
transfer from a brand-name company to a generic company as a cause of their main concern treating 
such agreements as a violation of article 101 TFEU and Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Such concern 
was fuelled by certain indications that generic competition in the pharmaceutical industry is not working 
well. The competition authorities defined reverse payment agreements as one of the reasons for the 
delay of generic drugs’ entry. Armed with provisions prohibiting restrictions on competition, the 
competition authorities have launched a campaign against these agreements. They claim violation of 
antitrust law if they find evidence of restriction on generic market entry along with value transfer from 
a brand-name to a generic company. 
 
The U.S. courts facing this new type of patent-antitrust disputes have proven more cautious in their 
judgments. They carefully separate from the bundle of reverse payment agreements only truly 
anticompetitive agreements as per their view, based on the already settled patent and antitrust case law 
and new rules and approaches. However, the Third Court’s maverick decision282 on 16 July 2012 
undermined the comparatively settled case law since 2005, which relies mainly on the scope of patent 
doctrine. Firmly rejected previous practice, the Court declared all settlement agreements containing 
reverse payments to be presumably unlawful. This stance has led to two conflicting decisions by the 
two different circuits concerning the same agreements. Before the Third Circuit decision, the Supreme 
Court had never agreed to consider the matter. Thus, one may assume that this tension will probably 
serve as a sound ground for the Supreme Court to address this tension and construe the guidance to the 
courts as to how approach such agreements. 
 
As the Court of Justice of the European Union has never considered this type of dispute, a U.S. Supreme 
Court decision on this matter may play a crucial role in establishing the relevant EU case law. As 
discussed above, however, the EU case law contains certain tests and approaches which may apply to 
the context of reverse payment agreements disputes. These judicial, administrative and political 
developments in the U.S. and the EU regarding the assessment of reverse payment agreements matter 
as the agreements are comparatively new: the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions have never 
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considered them. As soon as the practice settles in these jurisdictions, competition authorities in other 
jurisdictions are likely to follow that approach. 
 
This article aimed to analyse current developments in these two jurisdictions and to define the current 
status of reverse payment agreements. It also aimed to extract provisions which most likely will raise 
the interest of competition authorities and which may lead to the recognition of an agreement as illegal 
and violative of antitrust law. Since pharmaceutical companies may risk being the target of competition 
authorities’ investigations and subsequently litigation, such analysis pursued the practical goal of 
deepening understanding of what constitutes permitted behaviour for pharmaceutical companies when 
concluding this type of agreement to avoid antitrust liability. 
 
Therefore, despite some difficulties in deducing the coherent line regarding reverse payment 
agreements after the Third Circuit’s recent decision the following precautions would still seem sensible 
for those involved in negotiating settlements of patent disputes between pharmaceutical companies.283 
First, it is advisable to avoid settlements which restrict generic entry in relation to products, periods or 
geographical areas outside the scope of the patents in question.284 It is likewise reasonable to avoid 
settlements which include direct payments from originator to generic company or agreements such as 
royalty-free licences, as they might be seen as equivalent to a direct payment.285 
 
As a general recommendation, I would suggest the following. It could be cumbersome and complicated 
to produce one set of rules for such a complex issue, as each agreement may contain various provisions 
which distinguish it from a seemingly similar one. This variety forces competition authorities and courts 
to evaluate each agreement on a case-by-case basis. However, it may be useful to develop a specific set 
of guidelines based on the general principles which already exist in the U.S. case law, as well as in the 
EU. This consistency will help orientate the pharmaceutical industry and help both competition 
authorities and pharmaceutical companies conserve resources. 
 
Another proposal relates to the recent decision to establish European Patent Court. As future patent 
settlement agreements will undoubtedly concern the European patents and disputes held by the EPC, to 
avoid the divergent approaches observed in the U.S. courts it may be reasonable to submit these disputes 
to the EPC jurisdiction. It would be worth considering the possibility of evaluation by the EPC of the 
patent validity on a prima facia basis. In refusing to decide this issue whilst reviewing the conformity 
of the reverse payment agreements, the U.S. courts appeal partially to the presumption of patent validity 
and partially to the lack of the necessary knowledge in reviewing it.286 As the EPC is a specialised patent 
court, it has the ability to decide on patent validity on a prima facie basis. This approach would eliminate 
all doubts as to the strength of the patent and would exclude all allegations of undeserved monopoly 
gained by the weak or invalid patent. 
 
To conclude, though it may sound striking, however, in order to reconcile two legal systems 
(competition and patent) the result will be unavoidable: whilst patent is pending, the patent holder may 
exclude its competitors and settle the dispute, however anticompetitive it would not seem, unless this 
settlement exceeds the scope of the patent. Otherwise, the fragile balance could be injured, pushing the 
measures in one or another direction may damage or even destroy one of the systems. Overly strong 
patent protection will distort competition and ultimately harm consumers, who will suffer from the 
patent monopoly. The opposing situation, favouring competition over patent protection and expanding 
the boundaries of antitrust liability, will hamper industry innovation, also to the detriment of consumers. 
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